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ABSTRACT
Social influence has been an object of interest of social psychology for a long time. More recently,
sociophysics and Galam’s model provide an explanation of rumors spreading in a population explaining
some interesting social phenomena as diffusion of false information. Although Galam’s model and its
recent formalizations are suitable to describe some social behavior, they take into account populations with
homogeneous agents. Some recent contributions consider agents who do not change opinion and in some
cases are able to persuade the others. Starting from social psychology studies about the role of specific seat
occupation we provide a heterogeneous model in which those holding minority opinions can strategically
choose specific social gatherings to exert their influence. We simulate the opinion dynamics comparing
situations in which there is the minority to others with homogeneous agents. Our results show how the
opinion dynamics is affected by the presence of such a minority.
1 INTRODUCTION
Social psychology has widely investigated the role of social context in shaping individuals’ opinions,
attitude and decision-making (Brown 1988, Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone 1994).
Social influence, a research area in social psychology, (Brown 1988), shows how consensus arises among
individuals, explains how minority positions may succeed or fail in their diffusion, and sheds light on the
relation between cognitive processes underlying majority and minority influence (Moscovici and Personnaz
1980).
Interesting seminal studies in this area demonstrated the importance ofmajority influence over individuals
(Asch 1956, Festinger 1954). For example, in one of the most famous experiments conducted by Asch
(1956) individuals were introduced to a task on visual discrimination. The instructions consisted in matching
the length of a given line with other three. Participants were put in a group which was actually composed
by confederates and had to express their judgment after having heard others’ opinions. The confederates
gave the wrong answer on 12 trails over a total of 18. The findings revealed that even when the perceptual
judgments of confederates were objectively biased, individuals tended to conform to the majority.
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By contrast, other contributions (Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux 1969, Moscovici and Personnaz
1980) analyzed the effect of minority influence on individual decision-making. These studies have been
groundbreaking and helped to understand the diffusion of innovation (Mugny and Papastamou 1980), the
analysis of social change in social systems (Mugny and Papastamou 1982), and how minority may influence
dominant positions (Paichler 1976).
The experiment conducted by Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) had the same structure of
Asch’s experiments but in this case the confederates represented the minority of the group. As in Asch
experiments the task was based on perception: individuals had to judge the color of several slides, blue
or green. In six-subject groups, four individuals were the experimental subjects while two subjects were
actually confederates. From their analysis Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) found that when
minority had a coherent behavior was able to change about 8% of total answers when compared to the
control condition with no confederates.
The studies on minority are quite interesting to social psychologists as minority influence has a deep
impact on individuals’ beliefs (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone 1994): in fact, in
Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969), the authors revealed that biased perception induced by minority
influence was influencing judgment also after the first task. Moscovici and Lage (1976) compared the
effects triggered by minority and by majority and confirmed the hypothesis that majority influence affects
manifest level, that is just the public opinion showed to others, while minority influences both public and
private changes (Moscovici and Personnaz 1980). Accordingly, the change promoted by majority is called
compliance, whereas the change promoted by minority, conversion (Maass and Clark 1984).
From the seminal experiments of Moscovici (Moscovici and Personnaz 1980, Moscovici, Lage, and
Naffrechoux 1969) there have been several studies providing new insights and analysis on the effect of
minority (Butera, Mugny, Legrenzi, and Perez 1996, Shuper and Sorrentino 2004). Reviews on the main
processes underlying minority influences can be find in Crano and Seyranian (2007), Wood, Lundgren,
Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone (1994), and Maass and Clark (1984). In their review on 15 years
of research on minority influence Maass and Clark (1984) argued that a certain degree of flexibility of
minority may increase its effect on other respondants (Mugny 1975). Baker and Petty (1994) analyzed
the differences in individual scrutiny when a position is endorsed by a majority or a minority, Butera,
Mugny, Legrenzi, and Perez (1996) investigated the use of inductive reasoning according to whether the
source of information come from minority or majority and Shuper and Sorrentino (2004) studied individual
differences in certainty orientation in being influenced by a minority.
Studies on minority influence are interesting not only for the analysis of the underlying psychological
processes but, as underlined in the review of Maass and Clark (1984), find several examples of applications
as the analysis of the role of women in French society (Paichler 1976); decision-making (Nemeth and
Wachtler 1974), and air pollution (Mugny and Papastamou 1980).
2 OPINION SPREADING
Although experimental studies in psychology have provided interesting insights on the role minority
influence, this kind of analysis presents some limits. For example, as discussed in Moscovici and Personnaz
(1980), there is the possibility that minority influence has long-term effects and it is almost impossible to
take into account this temporal dimension in these experiments. Accordingly, in this case it is necessary to
implement some methods aiming at providing and test the hypothesis and theories derived in this context
in order to reinforce and better understand the phenomenon. An example of the integration can be found in
Galam and Moscovici (1991): in this paper the authors combine a number of social psychology hypothesis
with the methods of statistical physics. In particular, in this work the authors try to model collective
phenomena taking into account the studies on polarization of attitudes and decisions. According to the
Authors, this integration may promote the understanding of emergent phenomenona as well as a context
to validate these concepts.
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Consensus within group has also been analyzed by mathematical modeling, as for example in DeGroot
(1974) and Berger (1981). These kind of approaches allow to understand processes and factors important to
reach consensus in groups. In the last years, the interplay between strategic interaction and social influence
has been investigated in order to study the possibility of consensus equilibria (Buechel, Hellmann, and
Klo¨ßner 2013). For example, in this kind of models (Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner 2013), agents can
change their opinion in order to follow others’ opinions. This is explained by the fact that individuals
would incur in utility losses if anchored to the own reasons. A different line of research when studying
opinion dynamics is proposed in (Hegselmann and Krause 2002), and, more recently, by (Hegselmann,
Ko¨nig, Kurz, Niemann, and Rambau 2014). Another example of this interplay can be seen in Buechel,
Hellmann, and Pichler (2012), in which starting from the pioneeristic DeGroot model of opinion there is
an analysis of the influence of cultural traits in group decisions (DeGroot 1974).
2.1 Galam’s model
Several other contributions on the analysis of processes of social influence have been provided by other
disciplines. For example sociophysics, using tools and concepts from the physics of disordered matter,
is making a serious attempt to describe some aspects of social and political behavior; see for example,
Galam, Gefen, and Shapir (1982), Stauffer (2012), Nyczka and Sznajd-Weron (2013) or, for a critical
review, Galam (2012).
In particular Galam (2003) proposes a model to understand how rumors can be propagated within a
population. In his models, at time 0, N individuals hold an opinion–either True or False–on a particular
subject and discuss the issue at different social meetings. In the course of time t = 1,2, . . . , the same
people will meet again and again randomly in the same group configurations and may change their opinion
according to a majority rule.
According to the model, although an opinion can be the minority at the beginning, after a series of
social gatherings there could be a significant spread. This kind of formalization fits with the phenomenon
of diffusion of rumors in public debates. For example, in Galam (2003), the Author deals with the spread
of the notice in which it was claimed that no plane was crashed in the Pentagon on September 11.
The formalization of Galam’s model considers a N person finite population and assumes that only two
opinions, ‘+’ and ‘−’, are possible. The social space consist of several tables where the discussion takes
place. From this initial configuration, people start discussing the issue at the first social meeting. Each
new cycle of multi-size discussions is marked by an unitary time increment. In a group of size k with j
agents sharing opinion ‘+’ and k− j sharing opinion ‘−’, all k members adopt opinion ‘+’ if j > k/2;
on the contrary, everybody adopts opinion ‘−’ if j < k/2; in the symmetric case j = k/2 the outcome is
determined assuming a bias in favor of one of the two opinions; these rules are called discussion functions.
In the example depicted in Figure 1 there are 24 individuals and the social space consist of 5 tables with
sizes 3, 4, 4, 5 and 8 respectively. For the sake of brevity social spaces are denoted by a vector in which
components are the table sizes, in Figure 1 we have n = (3,4,4,5,8)
Therefore, the set of possible states of the population with respect to opinion ‘+’ is S= {0,1, . . . ,N},
where state 0 means consensus has been reached on opinion ‘−’ while, on the contrary, state N means
consensus has been reached on opinion ‘+’. In other words, the state of the population is the number of
individuals holding opinion ‘+’. Not all the states in S are necessarily feasible. State feasibility depends
obviously on both social space and the discussion function which is adopted.
Galam (2003) uses the binomial distribution to approximate the probability of having a specific number
of ‘+’ opinions at each table. As long as populations with a large number of agents and small size discussion
groups are considered the use of the binomial distribution is a good modeling approximation. However this
approach may create distortions in the prediction of the dynamics of rumors in small communities. In order
to deal with this problem, Merlone and Radi (2014) formalize the process as an absorbing Markov chain,
in which the states of the process correspond to the number of agents holding one opinion and compute
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after discussion
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Figure 1: A one step opinion dynamics. First stage, people sharing the two opinions are moving around.
Grey have opinion ‘−’ while black have opinion ‘+’. No discussion is occurring with 11 gray and 13
black. Second stage right, people take place at the tables the social space consists of. Third stage, within
each group consensus has been reached. As a result, they are now 12 gray and 12 black. Last stage, people
are again moving around with no discussion.
the transition matrices for several examples. The transition matrix is a stochastic matrix describing the
probabilities of particular transitions across the state space (Behrends 2000).
However both Galam’s original model and its recent formalizations (Merlone and Radi 2014) consider
only a majority rule with homogeneous agents. In the following section we introduce strategic minority
agents in order to study how minority can influence opinion dynamics. We consider a strategic minority able
to sit always at the maximum size table in which it represents the majority and then can exert its influence.
Other contributions have considered agents using influence. For example, in Galam’s model Ellero, Fasano,
and Sorato (2013) introduce opinion leaders, i.e., agents who always have opinion ‘+’ and are able to
persuade all the agents at their table. More generally, when interacting in networks, West, Turalska, and
Grigolini (2014) consider committed minority agents keeping an assigned decision independently of the
opinion of their neighbors. By contrast, the agents we consider here have some strategic abilities to find
the best table where to exercise their influence at the cost of potentially being influenced.
3 MODELING MINORITY
When modeling minority we can consider several different behaviors, some of which can be the result of
complex strategies, communication and coordination. In Galam (2003), one of the fundamental charac-
teristics of the model is the presence of a threshold to reach consensus: if minority is smaller than this
threshold, then its effect on opinion is irrelevant. Nevertheless, this does not capture the cases in which a
minority may adopt successful strategies in order to reach consensus.
In this paper, we try to fill this gap by considering a minority able to exert its influence in strategic
tables in order to control opinion dynamics, for this reason it will be called strategic minority. In our
opinion, this approach is closer to the psychological theories on minority influence (Wood, Lundgren,
Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone 1994) focusing on a minority able to influence others with coherent
strategies and may provide some suggestions to understand real cases in which such a strategy is followed
by a limited number of agents.
In particular, in our model first the strategic minority agents will all sit together at one of the tables
where they can exert an influence, then other agents are randomly distributed among tables, as in the
original model. This seating strategy relates to some well known studies in which seating at particular
places in tables is related to influence, see Sommer (1961), Hare and Bales (1963), Strodtbeck and Hook
(1961).
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We run two different types of simulations: one replicating Galam’s findings (Galam 2003) considering
two of the examples used in Merlone and Radi (2014). As discussed previously, the social influence of
minority is modeled as the capacity of a strategic minority of choosing always the best social configuration
to exert influence on others’ behavior. In other words, the majority influence rule remains the same as
in the Galam studies, but in our minority modeling the agents representing the minority have the ability
to find, when possible, a social gathering where they can influence the others. Furthermore, our strategic
minority is more fragile than the opinion leaders considered in Ellero, Fasano, and Sorato (2013) as the
latter always have opinion ‘+’ and are able to persuade all the agents at their table.
4 RESULTS
The approach presented by Merlone and Radi (2014) considers homogeneous agents and is based on
analytical derivations. By contrast, with strategic minority, agents heterogeneity makes such an explicit
computation of the transition probabilities too difficult and we resort to simulation. In particular we consider
three different social spaces. First we analyze two of the examples considered in Merlone and Radi (2014)
in order to compare how our simulation results match the analytical results there provided. Both examples
consist of 10 agents, yet with two different social spaces: n1 = (3,3,4), n2 = (5,5). Finally, we consider
how strategic minority may affect the opinion dynamics in the example depicted in Figure 1, i.e., 24 agents
n3 = n = (3,3,4,5,8). We select this specific example to show the dynamics in a more complex –yet still
manageable– social space.
For each social space we compare two scenarios: one with homogeneous agents and one with a strategic
minority. For each scenario 400,000 simulations were run to determine the transition matrix probability.
In the following, M will denote the transition matrices probability of homogeneous agents while Mˆ will
denote the transition matrices with a strategic minority. From these matrices we compute the probability
to converge to the absorbing states; they are represented graphically together with the expected time of
convergence to the absorbing states. These graphical representations are provided in Figures 2 to 7. The
left side of these figures represents the probabilities to converge, starting from state j ∈ S, to the respective
absorbing states for each social space and agents population. The right side of the figures represents the
expected time, z j, of convergence to absorbing states for each initial state j ∈ S. As we are considering
discrete states the dashed lines are there for illustrative purpose only. Obviously, when j is larger than
N/2, opinion ‘+’ is no longer a minority opinion. However the strategic minority agents’ behavior may
still have consequences on the opinion dynamics.
4.1 The case of 10 agents
As mentioned above, in Merlone and Radi (2014) two 10-agent social spaces are considered and the relative
transition matrices are analytically derived and reported. In order to validate the model (Sargent 1984), we
consider the same 10-agent social spaces in order to compare the probability transition matrices we find
by simulation.
First we consider the two 10-agent social spaces analyzed in Merlone and Radi (2014) to compare the
probability transition matrix obtained by simulation to those analytically derived with two different social
spaces: n1 = (3,3,4), n2 = (5,5). The transition matrices of the two social spaces considering Galam’s
model and strategic minority influence are reported in transition matrices (1) and (2) respectively. As
proved in Merlone and Radi (2014), when considering social space n1 = (3,3,4) the feasible states are 0,
3, 4, 6, 7, 10, while with social space n2 = (5,5) feasible states are 0, 5, 10.
State 0 represents the situation in which all the population converge to the opinion ‘−’, while 10 is
the state in which all agents converge to the opinion ‘+’.
Mn1 and Mn2 are consistent with Galam’s model prediction and the findings of Merlone and Radi
(2014).
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Mn1 =


1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.8672 0.0000 0.0000 0.1328 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.5996 0.0000 0.0000 0.3664 0.0340 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.2563 0.0000 0.0000 0.5819 0.1190 0.0000 0.0428 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5713 0.1660 0.0000 0.1665 0.0963 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1718 0.0425 0.0000 0.3756 0.4100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3328 0.3669 0.0000 0.0000 0.3002
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1335 0.1338 0.0000 0.0000 0.7328
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000


. (1)
Mˆn1 =


1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7148 0.0000 0.0000 0.2852 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2580 0.0000 0.0000 0.7420 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7432 0.0000 0.0000 0.2568
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2851 0.0000 0.0000 0.7149
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000


. (2)
Mˆn1 and Mˆn2 represent the transition matrices when considering a minority which always seats in a
fixed table in which the minority have a majority influence. As we can observe, we have in both cases
three absorbing states.
Mn2 =


1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.8328 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1672 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.4769 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5231 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5223 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4777
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1661 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8339
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000


. (3)
Mˆn2 =


1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7153 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2847
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2856 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7144
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000


. (4)
As it concerns social space n1, by comparing Figures 2(a) to 3(a) we can see that, with strategic minority
agents, state 4 becomes absorbing; this is confirmed by the entries in the fourth column of probability
transition matrix (2) and also in Figure 3(b) where the expected number of steps to converge to state 4 is 0.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
 j
 
 
 b0
 b10
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
6
 j
(b)
Figure 2: Case n1 = (3,3,4) without minority. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: (a) probability to
converge to the absorbing states 0 (grey circles) and 10 (black circles); b) expected time of convergence
to consensus (either 0 or 10).
When considering social space n2, besides states 0 and 10 also state 5 is absorbing (see Merlone and
Radi 2014). In this case the effect of minority is more subtle as states 4, 5 and 6 are a closed set, namely
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
 j
 
 
 b0
 b4
 b10
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
5
 j
(b)
Figure 3: Case n1 = (3,3,4) with a 3 minority. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: (a) probability to
converge to the absorbing states 0 (grey circles), 4 (hollow circles) and 10 (black circles); b) expected
number of steps to converge to absorbing states 0, 4 or 10.
starting from each one of these three states, the probability to reach a state different from these three states
is zero1. Moreover, such a closed set is such that with probability 1 the process reaches the absorbing state
5 in one step. The strategic minority does not affect the number of steps to convergence as it can be seen
by comparing Figures 4(b) and 5(b).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
 j
 
 
 b0
 b5
 b10
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
2
 j
(b)
Figure 4: Case n2 = (5,5) without minority. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: (a) probability to converge
to the absorbing states 0 (grey circles), 5 (hollow circles) and 10 (black circles); b) expected number of
steps to converge to absorbing states 0, 5 or 10.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
 j
 
 
 b0
 b5
 b10
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
2
 j
(b)
Figure 5: Case n2 = (5,5) with a 3 minority. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: (a) probability to
converge to the absorbing states 0 (grey circles), 5 (hollow circles) and 10 (black circles); b) expected
number of steps to converge to absorbing states 0, 5 or 10.
Comparing the last column of matrices Mn1 and Mn2 to respectively Mˆn1 and Mˆn2 we can see that
the entries of transition matrices with strategic minority are not larger than the corresponding ones with
no strategic minority. This is because when the number of agents with opinion ‘+’ is large, the strategic
1For further details see Behrends (2000). A closed set can also be called closed communicating class (Ibe 2009)
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positioning of minority agents is counterproductive. In facts, in this case strategic agents would be more
effective when spreading around.
4.2 The case of 24 agents
Now consider the case of 24 agents with social space: n3 = n = (3,3,4,5,8) as illustrated in Figure 1. In
this case, the feasible states are 0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, and 24. Transition
matrix (6) for strategic minority shows interesting results as in this case we do not have a new absorbing
state. In fact, when considering column 6 of transition matrix entries on rows 4 and 5 are 1.00 as expected.
Indeed, when agents starting with opinion ‘+’ are just 3 or 4 they are unable to obtain more than 5 agents
with opinion ‘+’. By contrast, on row 6 of the same column we find 0.99 as, when there are 5 agents with
opinion ‘+’, the strategic minority agents will seat at the size 5 table and there is a positive probability
that the other two ‘+’ opinions agent will seat at the size 3 table; in such a case, at the following turn,
there will be 8 agents with opinion ‘+’.
In (Galam 2003) the killing point is defined as the point where the monotonic flow –towards one of two
stable fixed points– changes direction. The killing point is important to characterize the rumor dynamics
when as it determines the border of the basin of attractions of the absorbing states. As with social space n3
the absorbing states are consensus either on ‘−’ or ‘+’, this notion has clear implications. Although the
killing point can be formalized either as in the original Galam model (Ellero, Fasano, and Sorato 2013) or
in the Markov chain formalization (Merlone and Radi 2014), intuitively it can be seen as the intersection
between the two dashed lines in Figures 5(a) and 6(a).
In Figure 6(a) we can see that absorbing state 0 is prevalent as long as the initial number of agents
with opinion ‘+’ is smaller than 14, that is, the killing point is between 14 and 15. By contrast, with a
strategic minority (Figure 7(a)) the killing point is between 2 and 3 and the probability to converge to ‘+’
is one when at the beginning more than 2 agents hold this opinion. Nevertheless, convergence is quite slow
as illustrated in Figure 7(b). This is because when starting with 3 strategic minority agents starting with
opinion ‘+’ they will seat at the 5 size table and at the following turn there will be always 5 agents with
opinion ‘+’; therefore the probability to end in the absorbing state 24 is small but positive.
In conclusion, although the strategic minority is able to drive consensus on opinion ‘+’ there is a steep
price to pay in terms of time to converge to such a consensus, when the initial number of agents with
opinion ‘+’ is smaller than the killing point for social space n3 with no strategic minority agents.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0
1
 j
 
 
 b0
 b24
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0
5
 j
(b)
Figure 6: Case n3 = (3,4,4,5,8) without minority. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: (a) probability to
converge to the absorbing states 0 (grey circles) and 24 (black circles); (b) expected number of steps to
converge to consensus (either 0 or 24).
By comparing the last column of matrices Mn3 and Mˆn3 , we can notice that the probability to be in the
state N seems smaller without the strategic minority. In other words, we can see that also for this social
space, when the number of agents with opinion ‘+’ is large the strategic positioning of minority agents is
counterproductive.
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Figure 7: Case n3 = (3,4,4,5,8) with a 3 minority. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: (a) probability
to converge to the absorbing states 0 (grey circles) and 24 (black circles); b) expected number of steps to
converge to consensus (either 0 or 24).
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed minority influence on opinion dynamics. In particular, we considered a minority
able to interact in social gatherings by taking place at strategic positions. The particular strategy we consider
may be effective in situations in which minority size is small and the risk to be wiped out by the majority
is high. Furthermore, this strategy is related to some well known studies in which seating at particular
places in tables is related to influence, see Sommer (1961), Hare and Bales (1963), Strodtbeck and Hook
(1961).
By simulation we found the transition matrices for the different social space we considered and were
able to observe the effects of strategic minority in terms of transition probabilities.
The presence of a strategic minority affects the opinion dynamics in several ways. Firstly, absorbing
states different from opinion consensus appear; this is interesting because in the original model (Galam
2003) only consensus to either opinion could be observed. By contrast, with a strategic minority the
dynamics is less predictable and under some conditions disagreement remains. Secondly, although the
strategic minority can tip the balance in favor of one opinion there is a cost to pay for this. In fact, the
very same strategy this kind of minority adopts may slow reaching consensus on the opinion they support.
Future research will focus on analyzing different social spaces. In particular, it will be interesting to
introduce minority influence in opinion dynamics when considering networks (Merlone, Romano, and Radi
). Finally, it will be also interesting to analyze the opinion dynamics when considering strategies different
from the the one considered in this paper.
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Mn3 =


1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.96 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.91 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.82 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.71 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.57 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.41 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.25 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.11 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.35 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.14
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.37 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.31
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.31 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.51
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.69
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.84
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.95
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00


. (5)
Mˆn3 =


1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.22
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.42
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.63
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.80
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.93
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00


. (6)
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